

TESTIMONY OF  
PAUL RAINWATER,  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE  
LOUISIANA RECOVERY AUTHORITY  
BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND  
SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS  
AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY  
May 20, 2009

Louisiana Recovery Authority  
150 Third Street, Suite 200  
Baton Rouge, LA 70801  
Voice: (225) 342-1700  
Fax: (225) 342-0002  
[lra.louisiana.gov](http://lra.louisiana.gov)

Thank you for this opportunity to address this committee about our progress and remaining challenges in Louisiana as we recover not only from hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but also from two new storms in 2008, Gustav and Ike. By this point in Louisiana, the vast majority of the state has suffered the effects of one or more of these hurricanes – from the high-profile catastrophe in the city of New Orleans to the complete devastation of Cameron Parish in the Southwest, which many people haven't heard of but is responsible for much of the nation's domestic oil and natural gas production, to North Louisiana, which is typically a safe haven during storms but last year experienced millions in damages from rain and wind as Gustav and Ike passed over.

The situation we face in Louisiana is unique – I know of no other state that has suffered such destruction in three years or that faces as many complex rebuilding issues. In context, the combined impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is the largest disaster in U.S. history. Measured only in terms of Stafford Act funds, it is larger than the next largest disaster -- the Attack on America on September 11, 2001 -- by four times and it is larger than the remaining top 10 disasters combined.

No discussion of the unprecedented level of CDBG aid would be complete without considering the catastrophic damage our state suffered in the span of three weeks after Hurricane Katrina, the failure of the federal levees and Hurricane Rita. Coupled with the damage inflicted last fall by Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, Louisiana faces a major recovery made even more complex by the national economic downturn. Our state will require continued special considerations from the federal government when it comes to federal regulations governing recovery-related funding streams.

## **Catastrophic Damage to Louisiana**

### **Impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita**

In 2005 the state of Louisiana bore the brunt of the biggest natural disaster in American history – Hurricane Katrina. Three weeks later Louisiana was hit by Hurricane Rita– now the third most expensive natural disaster in American history.

Hurricanes Katrina (landfall Aug. 29, 2005) and Rita (landfall Sept. 24, 2005) devastated south Louisiana, claiming 1,464 lives and displacing 900,000 residents. In the New Orleans metropolitan area, storm surge from Hurricane Katrina breached the city's levee protection system at several points. Eighty percent of the city was left underwater and thousands were stranded on rooftops and in shelters-of-last-resort. All 26,000 homes in St. Bernard Parish were damaged or destroyed. Hurricane Katrina also left behind major wind, rain and storm surge damage in Plaquemines, Jefferson, and St. Tammany parishes.

Three weeks later, storm surge from Hurricane Rita re-flooded parts of New Orleans before the storm made landfall in far eastern Texas, devastating much of Cameron Parish and leaving behind intense flood and wind damage in Calcasieu and Vermilion parishes. Hurricane Rita destroyed every building in Cameron Parish with the exception of the Parish Court House. Many other Louisiana parishes also suffered major damage from the storms.

The economic impact on Louisiana reaches into the tens of billions lost. Since the storms, estimates show more \$51 billion in federal funds have been spent in Louisiana, including monies for disaster response, rebuilding, the National Flood Insurance Program and loans from the Small Business Administration. In addition, Louisiana has invested several billion of its own funds in recovery.

These damage statistics are well known, but it is important to review the scale and scope of two of the largest natural disasters in the nation's history:

- More than 200,000 housing units with major or severe damage; 82,000 of these were rental units. Orleans parish alone had 50 percent of the damage statewide and lost more than 51 percent of the parish's rental units;
- Almost four years from the storms, more than 2,700 families in Louisiana are still living in FEMA temporary units and more than 26,000 are part of the DHAP Transitional Closeout program;
- This past fall the state experienced two devastating storms, Gustav and Ike. While not at the same scale of the 2005 events, these storms caused significant housing damage and economic interruption along the Gulf Coast.

Additionally, these storms caused much greater damage statewide than in 2005. Another 9,400 homes received major damage and 800 families have been placed in FEMA-assisted housing.

### **Impact of Hurricanes Gustav and Ike**

Hurricanes Gustav and Ike struck Louisiana on September 1, 2008 and September 12, 2008 respectively. The storms flooded approximately 12,000 homes and damaged approximately 200,000 more, caused as much as \$750 million in agriculture damages, damaged more than \$1 billion in infrastructure and caused \$2.5 to \$5 billion in business losses. Education facilities across the State suffered between \$100 and \$150 million in damages. The State evacuated more than one million citizens from South Louisiana and more than 1.5 million homes and business were without power for up to three weeks. The Louisiana Economic Development Department estimates that hurricanes Gustav and Ike left behind \$8 billion to \$20 billion in insured and uninsured physical damage.

In Louisiana, 46 people died in Hurricane Gustav and five died in Hurricane Ike. The state spent \$500 million on the initial response to Gustav and Ike. Following the storms, estimates indicate that FEMA Public Assistance claims in Louisiana will likely exceed \$800 million in damages.

### **Timeline of Federal Aid**

In the aftermath of Katrina and Rita, Louisiana received \$13.4 billion in Community Development Block Grant funds for disaster recovery, which the state divided among three priorities – housing, infrastructure and economic development. This allocation represents the vast majority of “discretionary” funds the state received. Many other funding sources, including FEMA Public Assistance funds and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program dollars have narrow uses or are tied to specific projects. CDBG funds are one of the few funding streams where the state has some flexibility to set priorities for its recovery, and even then, all of its plans face a public vetting and then final federal approval to ensure they conform to sometimes strict regulations.

Congress allocated \$11.5 billion in CDBG funds for Gulf Coast recovery at the very end of 2005, but capped Louisiana’s share of funds at 54 percent, even though the state received the lion’s share of housing and infrastructure damage during the 2005 hurricane season. When HUD allocated funds to the states in February 2006, Louisiana received only \$6.2 billion.

In the summer of 2006, after lobbying by the state, Congress allocated Louisiana an additional \$4.2 billion in CDBG funds, bringing the total of funds to \$10.4 billion. To access this funding, Louisiana has presented two Action Plans outlining potential uses of funds. In keeping with the state’s internal approval process and federal regulations, the Louisiana Recovery Authority’s board approves all Action Plans and amendments to these plans, they have a public comment period and plans totaling more than \$10 million receive a vote of the full Legislature. Following this, the Governor forwards the plans to HUD for approval. This process typically takes between 60 and 90 days from start to finish. In addition to the two overarching Action Plans, Louisiana has presented 31 amendments to the first plan and 12 amendments to the second plan to clarify programmatic rules and outline additional uses of funds. The 32<sup>nd</sup> and 33<sup>rd</sup> amendments are currently in their public comment phase.

Following months of administering the Road Home program, which is the largest single home rebuilding program in American history, Louisiana faced a deficit in 2007 because of higher than expected need and lower than expected insurance payouts. In November 2007, Senator Landrieu ensured that the state get a third allocation of \$3 billion in CDBG funds.

This final allocation included strict language that forbids Louisiana from using these funds for anything other than approved Road Home activities in the state’s original action plan. This language was attached to ensure that Louisiana would not open the program to new applicants or further expand funding to current program participants. In keeping with this language, HUD already has denied the state’s request to allow homeowners to exceed the program’s \$150,000 per applicant funding cap for the purposes of providing \$7500 grants for individual mitigation measures (IMMs), which

were included as an approved use in the original action plan. HUD ruled that this would be a program expansion that cannot be funded using the final \$3 billion allocation.

In the aftermath of Gustav and Ike, last fall Congress set aside a \$6.1 billion pool of CDBG funds for states affected by disasters in 2008. HUD allocated the first third of the funding at the end of November to states based on their levels of damage. As of the time this testimony was prepared, HUD had not yet allocated the final two-thirds of the allocation. Louisiana received \$438 million in the first round of funding and anticipates that it could receive hundreds of millions more when HUD allocates the remaining funds.

The state will set aside 25 percent of its total allocation for projects dealing with rental housing, agriculture and fisheries recovery and hurricane protection. The bulk of the funds will be allocated to the parishes based on their level of damage. Parishes will select from a menu of options and decide how they will spend the funds. Louisiana adopted this decentralized funding model for Gustav and Ike parishes after our experience using the Katrina and Rita funds and because of the smaller scale of devastation in the state.

Louisiana already has received HUD approval on its first Gustav/Ike Action Plan, meaning that it can begin drawing down administrative funds to launch programs. Last week, the Governor forwarded the first amendment to this plan to HUD for approval and the state already has held outreach and education sessions with parish officials about accessing the funds and is working on cooperative endeavor agreements with parish governments that will allow them to serve as subgrantees of the state.

Our state was the first state to submit its plan and receive approval for using its funds, mostly due to the critical need to access these dollars, our great familiarity with CDBG funds and our existing hurricane recovery organization. We stand ready to use any additional funds allocated to the state when HUD acts on the remaining funds Congress set aside last year.

## **Overview of Louisiana's CDBG programs for Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita Recovery**

In total the state's property losses after Hurricane Katrina, the failure of the federal levees and Hurricane Rita are estimated to be in excess of \$100 billion, when factoring public and private losses. Louisiana identified three priorities for its CDBG funds after the 2005 hurricane season – housing, infrastructure and economic development.

Housing was the top priority for CDBG funds because of the large unmet housing needs in the state, which saw the destruction of more than 200,000 homes. Following housing, the state dedicated funds to infrastructure needs, though the majority of public infrastructure rebuilding is funded with billions in FEMA Public Assistance funds. To address long term rebuilding needs that cannot be met using FEMA funds, Louisiana created the Long Term Community Recovery program, which set aside \$700 million in CDBG for projects in plans that parishes formulated and presented to the LRA's board for approval. Additional infrastructure investments included a program to rebuild fisheries infrastructure needed to support this critical industry in Louisiana, pools of funds for local governments and school systems and \$200 million for ratepayer mitigation to help repair heavily damaged electrical systems and stave off huge increases in energy bills.

The final priority was economic development. Despite the fact that more than 16,000 businesses flooded and 30 percent of all businesses in New Orleans failed after the storms, the federal government in 2005 and 2006 refused to give the Gulf Coast discretionary economic development funds. So our state carved out a small pool of several hundred million in CDBG for a grant and loan program, technical assistance and workforce development. Business need dwarfed the funding we could afford to allocate to this purpose because our other needs were so great.

A full accounting of Louisiana's Katrina and Rita CDBG budget and current expenditures is included in the appendix to this testimony.

## **The Road Home**

The cornerstone of Louisiana's recovery program is the Road Home housing program, which is divided into two components – Homeowner aid and the Small Rental Property Program. Though the Road Home has faced many trials and initially struggled to award grants, we now have paid almost \$8 billion to more than 124,000 Louisiana homeowners. Since the beginning of 2008 when Governor Jindal took office, we have disbursed more than \$2.2 billion to homeowners, re-launched the stalled elevation program and provided more than \$822 million in elevation dollars to 28,400 applicants, started serving applicants who sold their homes prior to the program's launch, revamped the appeals process so that it is more customer friendly and closed more than 31,500 of the most difficult applicant cases. The majority of the applicants we've closed since January 2008 had complicated cases and had been pushed to the back of the line while the contractor picked easier to close cases. In 2008, we had more than 20 successful mobile outreach sessions where we took Road Home and state of Louisiana staff into the community to meet with applicants one-on-one to discuss their issues.

Additionally, in 2008 we decided not to extend the state's controversial contract with ICF International, necessitating that we transition the program to new contractors. In general, the state and the public were not satisfied with ICF's performance, its treatment of applicants and the contract the previous administration signed with the company. We recently hired new contractors to take ICF's place, dividing the work of the company among three firms. By breaking the remaining work up, we can insure a more case management driven program for the remaining applicants. We anticipate that between 2,000 and 3,000 applicants could still close on their grants, though the new homeowner contractor is reviewing ICF's systems to determine if "buckets" of applicants marked as unable to close actually could be closed.

Many of the remaining applicants have difficult title, power of attorney and other legal issues that stand between them and closing on their Road Home grants. The state has provided and will attempt to continue to provide legal services for lower income Road Home applicants. Additionally, we do not have current deadlines for applicants to close. That said, we anticipate that the majority of closings for compensation and elevation grants will be complete by the end of 2009.

There has been some talk of potential unspent funds in the third CDBG allocation of \$3 billion. It is entirely too early to know what funds, if any, will remain at the end of the Road Home program. Clearly there is much interest in these funds, should they remain, and it is Louisiana's hope that the state would be able to access the funds to provide additional aid to homeowners and address unmet recovery needs. Because of strict language governing the use of these funds, we must work with HUD and the Congress to ensure they are used properly and may require some flexibility in the interpretation of federal regulations in order to achieve this. Additionally, legislation pending in the Louisiana Legislature requires that we provide full detail of the status of the funds later this year; the state certainly will share this information with its Congressional Delegation and this committee.

While the Small Rental Property Program, the second aspect of the Road Home, has been slower going than we had hoped, we have made great strides in the past year. When we took this program over from the previous administration, it had created only five rental units. We have now created 1,439 rental units using these funds. Additionally, we soon will begin offering advance payments to landlords, which was not something done under the original program implementation. This will speed up production of units significantly, as many landlords have been left unable to get financing for their reconstruction efforts due to the economic downturn.

Additionally, we have made great strides in our Low Income Housing Tax Credit "Piggyback" program, which pairs CDBG funds with GO Zone tax credits to help build large rental developments. Six of these complexes opened in March 2009 and another 18 are under construction, including several HUD complexes that will replace the "Big Four" public housing projects in New Orleans. CDBG funding has been critical gap financing that has kept many of these developments afloat during this tough economic time.

In total, when looking at this Piggyback program and other tax credit initiatives by the Louisiana Housing Finance Agency, in Louisiana we have created 7,548 rental units statewide, including 2,364 in Orleans parish. We have another 5,228 units under construction across the state and we expect almost all of these – 5,100 – to come online by the end of the year. When coupled with our investments in the Road Home Small Rental program, this will provide much more

affordable housing for residents and help stabilize the very uncertain rental market in New Orleans and the surrounding areas.

## **Remaining Unmet Recovery Needs**

As mentioned above, we've made great progress in our recovery. But we still have great needs in order to stabilize our families and rebuild our neighborhoods into strong and vibrant communities.

### **Homeowner Repairs**

- Our greatest need is to get our families back into their homes. While the Road Home program has contributed great resources to our families, a number of barriers continue to prevent homeowners from completing their repairs.
- Initial damages that exceed the combined resources from insurance and the Road Home
- Lack of construction management expertise and resource on behalf of homeowners
- Increases in costs of materials and construction labor
- Increases in insurance costs limit what individuals can put into their homes
- Homeowner resources have been stretched as families try to support temporary rental costs and a mortgage simultaneously
- Significant contractor fraud has drained the resources of homeowners. Estimates from LouisianaRebuilds.info and LSU survey indicate that more than 9,000 families have been victim to contractor fraud in the last three years.

### **Blight Remediation**

- Rebuilding homes is paramount, but will only be successful if we take serious measures to eradicate blight within our neighborhoods.
- Recent research shows that more than 60,000 homes in New Orleans and St. Bernard remain blighted. While much of this will be addressed by homeowners rebuilding their homes and the state and parishes' efforts to bring the Louisiana Land Trust properties back into commerce, blighted properties will still remain.
- Many of these properties remain in disrepair three years after the storms. Large numbers of properties have not been demolished or repaired since the 2005 storms; recent storms only exacerbated the problem. Orleans and St. Bernard parishes alone have approximately 60,000 blighted properties.
- While great progress has been made on many fronts in the recovery, the magnitude of the damage caused by the storms has left parishes with blighted communities—houses in disrepair, commercial strip malls that remain devastated, few neighbors and even fewer businesses. These conditions and the lack of appropriately aligned resources strain public safety resources, reduce property values and tax revenue and threaten the economic viability of the parishes. This lack of action has also made it more expensive for the properties to be returned to commerce.
- The state has committed resources to address the blight conditions that prevent economic recovery but more must be done. In addition to funds to repair and rebuild owner-occupied and rental residential properties, the state has set aside funds to conduct demolition and slab removal for a segment of properties. It has also put resources into financing tools in order for individuals to be able to access repaired owner-occupied properties.
- Unfortunately, these resources only cover a segment of the properties that were taken out of commerce following these disasters.

### **Rental Needs**

- While the state is grateful for the significant resources it received, it received only enough funding to rebuild a portion of units lost – approximately 30,000 of the 82,000 damaged or destroyed. The state has designed its housing programs with a commitment to develop affordable housing within mixed income developments.
- Since January 2009, the state's Piggyback program, which relies on GO Zone Low Income Housing Tax Credits in order to enable the mix of affordable and market rate units that make these projects successful, has completed more than 850 rental units. Another 1,500 are scheduled for completion by the end of the summer.

- While we are just seeing success with this program, the economic downturn is wreaking havoc on this program and other housing development that depends on a combination of Low Income Housing Tax Credits paired with disaster CDBG resources. While 854 units have closed to date, more than 30 projects are in jeopardy of not closing because of the current credit crisis and economic downturn. This equals a shortfall of more than \$250 million to \$300 million if these credits are not monetized like the credits under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.

## **Solutions: Meeting Critical Housing Needs, Resources and Recommendations**

In order to address many of the outstanding housing and neighborhood rebuilding issues, much discussion has been made of the outstanding funds in the Road Home program. Our primary mission is to close as many of the grants as possible and to give as large a grant as eligible under the program's rules.

Although the Road Home Program was the largest rebuilding program in the history of the country, the amount of funding provided still did not match the level of damage. There continue to be gaps in funding that prevent individuals from rebuilding their homes and their lives. The additional proposed programs are in keeping with the intent of the recovery dollars approved by congress and are critical to the rebuilding efforts of many of our citizens who still struggle to rebuild.

### **GO Zone Credit Exchange**

The GO Zone tax credits represent one of the most significant rebuilding tools in the Gulf Coast tool kit. Under our Piggyback program, we have been able to leverage the tax credits more than three to one through support from our disaster CDBG funding.

We are grateful for our delegation's support of our efforts to request the same regulatory application of these credits as those under the ARRA. On May 14, 2009, the Senate passed a supplemental to assist in securing the GO Zone tax credits for continued rebuilding in the Gulf states. Section 1204 permits TCAP funds to be used with GO Zone and disaster low-income housing tax credits under ARRA. We would encourage the House, during Conference, to also insert language in section 1204 that allows GO Zone and disaster low-income housing tax credits to be eligible for exchange of GO Zone and disaster credits for cash grants under ARRA.

The GO Zone tax credits were not given to us with the caveat of 'unless the economy tanks,' they were meant to instill hope in our rebuilding and recovery. To not allow these credits to follow the exchange offered under the ARRA is to walk away from the promise of our recovery.

### **Homeowner Rehabilitation Program**

This will run as a traditional construction program targeted to homeowners that have remaining significant barriers to getting into their homes. This can include homeowners who received Road Home and/or insurance payments that were insufficient, victims of construction fraud, or extenuating circumstances that impacted the homeowners ability to rebuild (such as the necessity to pay rent and a mortgage simultaneously). This program would operate through qualified non-profit organizations that could assist with construction and financial management.

The state has already set aside a \$5 million pilot program for the most damaged communities. This program will be sent to HUD today for approval after completing public comment. Additionally, the state approved a \$20 million rehab program in New Orleans in June 2008 for this purpose, which has yet to launch, and a similar \$4 million program in Plaquemines to be sent to HUD today for approval.

### **Mid-Size Rental Housing Program**

In order to continue to replace units that have been lost since the storms, this program will be targeted for parishes that have the need for additional rental housing. It is designed to fill the gap between the Small Rental Property Program, which only covers up to a four-unit complex, and programs designed for large rental projects. This program would operate in the same manner as the revised small rental program and offer up front repair dollars and additional incentives for serving low to moderate income households.

### **Homeowner/Rental Hybrid (Damaged Property Program)**

There were approximately 470 'special cases' that did not fully qualify for the Road Home program and either did not qualify or missed the deadline for the Small Rental Property Program. These include individuals that rented a portion of their home or former landlords who wanted to rebuild a rental unit to live in themselves. A set aside of approximately \$60M would provide rebuilding dollars for these individuals. This would operate as a compensation program for those who qualified.

### **Blight Remediation Program**

What is needed is a Blight Remediation Program to enable these communities to remove or repair and rebuild damaged rental, owner-occupied structures and commercial structures. Resources could also be used to incentive the relocation of businesses such as green business and energy efficient manufacturers to abandoned industrial space.

In addition, this program would provide construction dollars matched to a particular Louisiana Land Trust property. Grant recipients would be neighborhood groups, non-profits or parishes. Infill could include homes, community centers, or other public structures. Resources would be provided for construction. In return, applicant is responsible for rehabilitation or new construction on the property and assumes maintenance and liability for the property.

### **Goals for 2009**

As we move through another year in Louisiana's recovery from four devastating hurricanes in three years, the state anticipates continues progress by the end of the year, including the approval of more that 75 percent of parish rebuilding funds; creating and repairing more than 5,100 rental units; returning Louisiana Land Trust properties back into commerce and nearing the completion of the Road Home program.

Thank you for your time and for your generous and continued support of Louisiana's recovery.

# APPENDIX

## Disaster CDBG Program Appropriations, Allocations and Expenditures as of 5/15/2009

Appropriations and Allocations	Congressional Appropriations	Proposed Allocations	Restricted Balances
1st Appropriation	\$6,210,000,000	\$6,206,797,382	\$3,202,618
2nd Appropriation	\$4,200,000,000	\$4,187,356,666	\$12,643,334
3rd Appropriation	\$3,000,000,000	\$3,000,000,000	\$0
<b>Sum:</b>	<b>\$13,410,000,000</b>	<b>\$13,394,154,048</b>	<b>\$15,845,952</b>

Administration and Technical Assistance	Louisiana Allocations as of 5/2009	Expenditures thru 5/15/2009	Remaining Balances
Administration and Technical Assistance	\$191,300,000	\$29,234,865	\$162,065,135
<b>Sum:</b>	<b>\$191,300,000</b>	<b>\$29,234,865</b>	<b>\$162,065,135</b>

Economic Development Programs	Louisiana Allocations as of 5/2009	Expenditures thru 5/15/2009	Remaining Balances
Louisiana Bridge Loan*	\$17,000,000	\$5,578,303	\$11,421,697
Louisiana Tourism Marketing	\$28,500,000	\$28,494,212	\$5,788
Recovery Workforce Training	\$38,000,000	\$17,691,394	\$20,308,606
Research Commercialization/Educational Enhancement	\$28,500,000	\$7,645,823	\$20,854,177
Small Firm Recovery Loan and Grant	\$209,032,456	\$153,003,532	\$56,028,924
Technical Assistance to Small Firms	\$9,500,000	\$6,089,357	\$3,410,643
<b>Sum:</b>	<b>\$330,532,456</b>	<b>\$218,502,622</b>	<b>\$112,029,834</b>

Housing Programs	Louisiana Allocations as of 5/2009	Expenditures thru 5/15/2009	Remaining Balances
Building Code Enforcement	\$16,390,000	\$13,738,906	\$2,651,094
First Time Homebuyer Pilot Program	\$40,000,000	\$6,364,360	\$33,635,640
Homelessness Supports and Housing	\$25,900,000	\$6,299,667	\$19,600,333
Homeowners Assistance	\$9,986,716,534	\$8,432,151,685	\$1,555,564,840
Housing Development Loan Fund	\$16,570,000	\$2,197,373	\$14,372,627
Land Assembly Operations	\$2,070,000	\$668,032	\$1,401,968
LIHTC/CDBG Piggyback	\$581,046,000	\$186,378,303	\$394,667,697
Small Rental Property	\$751,462,250	\$110,876,903	\$640,585,347
Soft Seconds	\$75,000,000	\$0	\$75,000,000
Supportive Housing Services	\$72,730,000	\$766,256	\$71,963,744
Support to Community Based Programs	\$2,070,000	\$1,377,360	\$692,640
<b>Sum:</b>	<b>\$11,569,954,784</b>	<b>\$8,760,818,845</b>	<b>\$2,810,135,930</b>

Infrastructure Programs	Louisiana Allocations as of 5/2009	Expenditures thru 5/15/2009	Remaining Balances
Fisheries Assistance	\$28,750,000	\$30,296	\$28,719,704
Infrastructure Program Delivery	\$15,000,000	\$695,335	\$14,304,665
Local Government	\$91,333,333	\$2,231,575	\$89,101,758
Long Term Community Recovery	\$700,000,000	\$5,911,394	\$694,088,606
Primary and Secondary Education	\$247,500,000	\$59,060,837	\$188,439,163

Ratepayer Mitigation	\$200,000,000	\$180,812,593	\$19,187,407
<b>Sum:</b>	<b>\$1,282,583,333</b>	<b>\$248,742,031</b>	<b>\$1,033,841,302</b>

Planning	Louisiana Allocations as of 5/2009	Expenditures thru 5/15/2009	Remaining Balances
Environmental Clearance	\$4,283,475	\$1,855,277	\$2,428,198
Planning	\$15,500,000	\$9,744,645	\$5,755,355
<b>Sum:</b>	<b>\$19,783,475</b>	<b>\$11,599,921</b>	<b>\$8,183,554</b>

Total Allocated by Louisiana as of 5/2009	Total Expended as of 5/15/2009	Total Remaining Balance
\$13,394,154,048	\$9,268,898,283	\$4,125,255,765